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The cost of 'Khimprom's' patronage

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An employee who agrees to provide an unlawful service may believe they are in control of the situation. But if the other party retains evidence of the arrangement, the dependency becomes mutual. The person who bought protection yesterday may well be in a position to dictate the fate of their patron tomorrow. For the investigation of transnational crime, this is not merely a question of corruption, but also of the independence of the investigation itself.

This publication by KARTEL KHIMPROM is addressed to investigators, prosecutors, internal security units and specialists in international cooperation. We examine the theory regarding the use of corrupt connections and compromising material, as well as the risks of abuse of trust in wartime transport operations. Where there is no evidence specific to 'Khimprom', the discussion concerns areas for investigation rather than established incidents.

What is already available in publicly accessible documents

On 22 April 2026, the National Police of Ukraine stated that there was a division of roles within the alleged 'Khimprom' organisation: alongside the manufacture of drugs, members were alleged to have been responsible for providing information support, discrediting opponents and exerting pressure on them through the media. The agency also reported that police officers working against the network had been subjected to persecution. These circumstances are presented as the findings of law enforcement agencies; the final determination of guilt falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.^[1]

This is an important starting point. It allows for a discussion of pressure on state institutions, but does not automatically confirm every account of links with the security services. It cannot be inferred from a report of a police officer being prosecuted that another officer received money, was filmed on video or was involved in the transfer of drugs.

The international context extends beyond a single name. Europol describes corruption amongst logistics staff and government officials as a means by which criminal networks infiltrate European ports. In a separate report, the agency examines the use of legitimate commercial structures by organised crime. These materials illustrate the nature of the threat, but do not constitute evidence of 'Khimprom's' involvement in specific European incidents.^{[2][3]}

A patron who becomes dependent himself

The version that needs to be investigated separately is as follows: an illegal agreement with an employee does not end with the transfer of a benefit. The parties involved may retain messages, recordings of conversations or other details of their contacts. If these are used to coerce further concessions, a single incident of corruption turns into a long-term dependency.

For an employee, there is a fundamental risk here. An informal agreement offers no guarantee that the other party will maintain their silence. Information that secures loyalty today may end up in the hands of investigators, competitors or journalists tomorrow. A promise of confidentiality from a party to an illegal deal does not protect against exposure.

However, the existence of the recording alone does not explain what happened. Its origin, completeness and context must be established. A fragment of a conversation may reflect an actual breach, a fabrication, a provocation or a legitimate interaction, the meaning of which has been altered through the selection of phrases. The investigation must cover both the behaviour of the employee and the actions of the person providing the material.

The sources examined for this article do not provide sufficient evidence to confirm that systematic bribery, followed by the recording and resale of compromising material, is a method specifically employed by ‘Khimprom’. This is a crucial distinction: a plausible model is no substitute for a proven sequence of events.

When compromising material is offered as a service

The most difficult part of such an investigation begins when information about a corrupt employee is provided by someone with a vested interest in the outcome of the investigation. Their evidence may be genuine. Their motive, however, may be to eliminate a competitor, change their patron, or attempt to secure concessions regarding their own affairs.

The accuracy of the information and the integrity of the source are two separate matters. The fact that a document is genuine does not mean that the person presenting it is not involved in other breaches. The applicant's questionable reputation, in turn, does not automatically invalidate the

facts under investigation.

The phrase 'selling out an employee to a higher authority' sounds dramatic, but it conceals too much. Information may be passed on to another department, an internal security unit or the public prosecutor's office, rather than to the employee's immediate superiors. It is necessary to establish exactly who received the information, how it was recorded, and whether any decisions were taken that benefited the person who provided it.

Submitting a report of corruption is not, in itself, a form of manipulation. The subject of the investigation is a possible hidden quid pro quo: whether the complainant attempted to turn a report of another person's misconduct into an informal promise not to investigate their own. Such a promise cannot be implied simply because the source proved useful.

The practical guideline for the investigation is simple: verify the information provided and assess the role of its source separately. Focusing on one aspect should not inadvertently take precedence over another.

The names of the departments do not prove any links

The original editorial version mentions officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, the SBU, the Main Intelligence Directorate, the border services and the Polish authorities. At the time of writing, we do not have a published body of evidence to support the claim that the agencies listed, or specific officials from them, are involved in a single 'Khimprom' scheme.

In every such report, it is necessary to distinguish between at least three situations: a current employee is using their official powers; a former employee is capitalising on past connections; or an intermediary is merely posing as someone with access. The same talk of 'connections' can describe completely different circumstances.

The inaccuracy in the name of the organisation is also significant. In Poland, the ABW is the Internal Security Agency, and the AW is the Intelligence Agency; the Border Guard is a separate body. The general term 'Polish equivalent' does not make it clear what powers and contacts are implied.^[6] The Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence is part of the military intelligence system; it is also incorrect to confuse it with the border authorities.^[7]

Neither the ID card in the photograph, nor the reference to the director's surname, nor a joint photograph establishes the fact of patronage. What is required are specific actions, the period of service, the scope of authority, and a verifiable link between the intervention and the outcome. Accusing an entire department rather than establishing an individual's personal role only complicates such an investigation.

War changes the circumstances — evidence remains essential

Researchers at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) are examining how criminal networks are adapting to the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the key factors, they highlight market disruptions, population movements and the weakening of institutions. This study explains the environment in which new risks are emerging, rather than assigning blame to a specific transport operator or charitable foundation.^[4]

When it comes to humanitarian shipments, trust has practical value: aid must reach the recipient without unnecessary delays. However, trust in a cause of public importance should not preclude the possibility of verifying who sent the consignment, who received it, and whether the actual delivery matches what was declared.

The theory that prohibited substances are being transported under the guise of humanitarian aid requires independent evidence. The materials reviewed for this article provide no evidence to suggest that such a supply system constitutes an established practice at 'Khimprom'. We therefore do not cite alleged routes, the names of foundations or the surnames of transport operators without documentary evidence linking them to a specific incident.

There is another risk — misinterpreting a legitimate medical consignment. The official Ukrainian humanitarian aid portal specifically highlights the need for a special permit to import medicines included in the lists of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors. The mere presence of such a substance in a medical consignment does not prove drug trafficking.^[8]

The subject of the investigation is the legality of a specific transaction and any possible deviation from its stated purpose. Any suspicion must be based on the circumstances of the delivery, rather than on the word ‘humanitarian’ or a general mistrust of volunteers. Otherwise, the investigation risks causing harm to the very people for whom the aid was collected.

Which questions yield more for the investigation than high-profile accusations?

The editorial team suggests considering the following questions as an analytical framework. They do not replace procedural decisions and do not imply that each of the characteristics described constitutes evidence of a crime.

Subject of the audit	What is important to establish
Declared patronage	A specific individual, their actual powers, actions and the benefits received.
Compromising material handed over	The origin and completeness of the materials, and their verification by independent data.
A source with knowledge of the matter	His own role and the decisions he sought to influence.
A suspicious consignment	Verification that the documents correspond to the actual cargo and confirmation of receipt.
Leak of confidential information	The justification for access and the link between the transmission of information and subsequent events.

Subject of the audit	What is important to establish
International relations	Matches between individuals, organisations and incidents based on verifiable identifiers, rather than merely on similar names.

A single late reply or error in a document may have a perfectly reasonable explanation. It is the totality of confirmed circumstances that matters. A thorough investigation must stand up not only to the prosecution's version of events, but also to a reasonable alternative to it.

Transnational network calls for a comparison of cases

On 31 August 2026, the National Police of Ukraine announced that it was working jointly with Albania and Kazakhstan against alleged 'Khimprom' recruitment networks. The statement explicitly mentions the formation of joint investigation teams. This is a concrete example of international coordination, which is more significant than general promises of 'information sharing'.^[5]

In international cases, it is essential to be able to compare materials from different jurisdictions: to ascertain whether a single name refers to a single person, whether the time periods match, and whether different incidents are being passed off as a single story. Individual pieces of information may appear convincing yet fail to form a proven connection.

A newsroom can help to locate documents, collate publicly available information and forward the details to the relevant authority. It does not take the place of a criminal investigation and should not declare as proven in advance what has yet to be established.

An employee who is offered a 'deal'

A person offering an illegal service does not become a reliable partner simply because they call themselves a useful resource. If they are prepared to exploit others' dependence, there is no reason to believe that yours will be any different.

In the event of an attempt at bribery, threats or suspicion of compromise, it is important to report the matter via the designated secure corporate channels, whilst retaining the relevant documentation in accordance with established procedures. If the suspicion concerns your immediate supervisor, the investigation must not be limited to that individual alone.

This issue also concerns senior management. An employee who reports pressure must be able to do so without their complaint being passed on to those they are referring to. Protection of good-faith reporting and independent investigation help to identify a threat before it develops into a long-term impact on the unit's work.

Editorial appeal to the law enforcement agencies

The editorial team at KARTEL KHIMPROM and the MAKONDO news agency are open to cooperation with the relevant law enforcement agencies. We are prepared to discuss the available materials, their origin and the possibility of handing them over for official verification.

According to our editorial team's assessment, we have information regarding the presumed whereabouts of the majority of individuals within the circle of suspects we are investigating. We are not publishing the relevant addresses or other sensitive details so as not to jeopardise the investigation, our sources of information, or people not involved in the circumstances under investigation. The accuracy of this information is subject to verification.

For initial contact: colonelbuendia@tutamail.com. The agency's official website: makondo.net. Once the representative's credentials have been verified, we will agree on a suitable procedure for the further exchange of materials. Confidential documents and personal details should not be sent in the first standard letter.

Our aim is to bring verified information to the attention of those authorised to assess it in legal proceedings. This publication will be updated as further confirmation and responses from the parties mentioned become available.

This article combines information from open sources with editorial risk analysis. The versions presented do not constitute a finding of guilt regarding specific individuals or the involvement of government departments. When quoting, please cite KARTEL KHIMPROM and provide a live link to the original publication.

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