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Sergey Semennikov — the king of precursors?

A source links Sergei Semennikov to the organisation of the smuggling, production and transport of precursors. What do public records, the Sumy registers and the Monaco records reveal?

Sergey Semennikov on the cover with the red inscription ‘Precursors?’ against a backdrop of shipping containers.

In 2023, Sergei Semennikov was mentioned in a publication about ‘Khimprom’ in connection with a single role: the supply of precursors from Russia. Three years later, a source from ‘Kartel Khimprom’ describes a far broader role. According to this source, Semennikov plays a key role in organising drug smuggling, the production of precursors and their transport. The answer to the question in the headline depends on exactly what he controlled and when.

There are two specific points in this story that can be verified. The first is the corporate records from Sumy. These contain shareholdings, company codes and a history of changes. The second is the source’s account of property in Monaco and other European countries. The key document is not yet available there — the record of the transfer of title bearing the buyer’s name. It will only be possible to link these stories through specific transactions and documents.

First public mention. What Semennikov was alleged to have been involved in back in 2023

On 31 October 2023, RIA Novosti published an article on the division of roles within ‘Khimprom’. An unnamed source told the agency that the supply of precursors from Russia fell within the remit of Sergei Semennikov, born in 1979. The report did not specify which consignment was in question, who the sender was, or what document confirmed Semennikov’s role. RIA Novosti report dated 31 October 2023.

A report from the editorial archive contains more detailed biographical information and the same wording regarding responsibility for supply. The authors placed Semennikov in the ‘Security Unit’ section, but the description of his specific role relates to precursors. The authorship and exact date of the report’s compilation have not been established. The editorial team is also unaware whether the RIA source relied on the same material. Therefore, the similarity in wording is important for the chronology, whilst the independence of these accounts remains an open question.

What the source adds: from production to transport

According to a source close to the editorial team, Semennikov continues to play a key organisational role at ‘Khimprom’. The source links him to three activities: organising drug smuggling, the production of precursors and their transport. If this account is accurate, it involves the coordination of several stages in the supply chain. The source speaks of management, but the editorial team does not yet have documents enabling it to name a specific consignment, production site or transport operation for which Semennikov was responsible.

Why is accuracy important here? Precursors are chemical substances that can be used in the manufacture of drugs. Some of these substances have legitimate industrial uses, which is why international controls also cover the legal trade, to prevent chemicals from falling into the hands of illicit manufacturers. The theory regarding the release of raw materials is verified using one set of documents. The theory regarding their illegal movement across the border is verified using another. A separate incident with a confirmed composition of the consignment is required to report the smuggling of finished drugs. The European Commission on the control of precursors.

The most important question regarding the source’s account is: who made the decisions? A name appearing in correspondence may indicate an acquaintance or involvement in a specific operation. To conclude that someone played a leading role, we need information on who gave orders, managed the funds and determined to whom the consignment should be handed over. A specific incident with several such indicators would provide grounds for assessing the extent of the authority referred to by the source.

The word ‘continues’ in the source’s statement requires verification. The date of the RIA article marks the moment when the theory about the shipments became public. It says nothing about the timing of the shipments described. The archive reference also does not provide dates for individual operations. To trace Semennikov’s role over time, a chronology of at least two incidents with comparable characteristics is needed: who was involved, when the shipment took place, and what evidence confirms that the order came from him. There is as yet no such documented sequence of events linking the earlier publication with the source’s latest statement.

Sumy. Two companies and a change to the register in 2026

In publicly available Ukrainian corporate data, the full name of Sergei Vladimirovich Semennikov appears in two entries. According to our editorial team, both relate to the subject of this article. The public records themselves allow us to verify the size of shareholdings and some of the changes in the ownership structure.

Sumikomunservice LLC, EGRPOU 36707878. The company was registered on 10 November 2009. In the list of shareholders, Semennikov is listed as holding 50 per cent of the authorised capital, with a contribution of 300,000 hryvnias. The other half is owned by another shareholder. The date of registration indicates when the company was established. The date from which Semennikov has held his share is not specified separately in this entry. YouControl corporate profile.

Private enterprise ‘School for the Inclusive Integration of People with Disabilities and Vocational Adaptation’, EGRPOU 45877523. Semennikov is listed as holding a 25 per cent stake. He also appears on the company profile as a beneficial owner. The change history contains a dated entry: on 28 May 2026, the company changed its name and its authorised capital increased from 1,000 to 100,000 hryvnias. The public profile separately shows Semennikov’s addition to the list of beneficiaries, but the exact date of this change is hidden in the public version. Owners and history of changes on Opendatabot.

The main activity of the second company is education. The list of additional activities includes the purchase, sale and letting of property. This raises a specific question about the company’s actual operations: did it enter into property transactions, in what capacity and in which country? The materials available to this publication contain no documentation of any overseas transactions by this company. Nor has the source provided any evidence linking the activities of the two companies to the supply of precursors.

Three different figures are relevant to the financial aspect of the investigation: the contribution to the authorised capital, the purchase price of the share, and the money that the co-owner actually received from the company. The first figure is visible in the ‘Sumikomunservis’ file. The school’s profile shows the changes in total capital. Clarification regarding actual payments or the source of funds for the alleged purchase in Europe will require further documentation. This is particularly important if the transactions were carried out in different years and on behalf of different individuals.

Monaco. What can be verified regarding the property allegations

A source close to the editorial team claims that Semennikov has acquired property in Monaco and other European countries. The editorial team has checked the various spellings of his surname Semennikov and Semennykov in Monaco’s public commercial register. The search returned similar surnames, but there was no exact match in the results. This check covers corporate records for the surnames entered. Ownership of property is verified against data from a separate register. Extract from the Monaco Trade Register.

In Monaco, information regarding the registration of transfers of rights can be requested from Mortgage Registry. To make a specific enquiry, the editorial team requires at least the property ID or the buyer’s name, if the transaction was carried out by a legal entity. If the source confirms that the matter concerns the French side of the border, France has its own procedure for requesting information on property via Land Registry. As of 17 November 2026, the editorial team has no statement or contract that would confirm Semennikov’s purchase. Registration procedure in Monaco. The procedure for making a request in France.

What the latest National Police documents fail to reveal

On 5 November 2026, the National Police of Ukraine reported a link between the U420 network and ‘Khimprom’. The report contains specific findings from the investigation — 281 searches carried out as part of the April operation, the seizure of nearly 4 million USDT, and reports that six individuals are under suspicion. Semennikov is not named in the report. The editorial team found no procedural document in the verified publicly available materials that would link him to this incident or establish his status in relation to the supplies described by the source. Statement by the National Police of Ukraine dated 5 November 2026.

The police describe a specific distribution network. According to their information, in April, production, packaging and distribution sites in Kyiv and Dnipro were shut down. The investigation also reported the freezing of 416 company accounts which it links to the scheme. To link this case to what the source described, evidence is needed that identifies the supplier of raw materials and demonstrates a connection to a specific site. The published report contains no such link to Semennikov.

The question ‘King of Precursors?’ can now be posed in more specific terms. What operation, according to the source, did Semennikov personally organise, when did it take place, and who carried out his orders? As for the property theory, the question is just as specific — in whose name is the transfer of title registered? The editorial team is prepared to examine the documents relating to these incidents and to publish a statement from Semennikov or his representative.

Sources

  1. RIA Novosti report dated 31 October 2023 ↗
  2. The European Commission on the control of precursors ↗
  3. YouControl corporate profile ↗
  4. Owners and history of changes on Opendatabot ↗
  5. Extract from the Monaco Trade Register ↗
  6. Registration procedure in Monaco ↗
  7. The procedure for making a request in France ↗
  8. Statement by the National Police of Ukraine dated 5 November 2026 ↗
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